When we choose an app for a child, we usually ask one thing: will it help? That is the right first question. But there is a second one we almost always forget to ask:
“Where do my child’s photos, the voices of their loved ones and everything they try to say end up?”
For many years I built systems where data security was not an optional extra – for banks and large companies. When we started building Kalbeja, it was clear to me that a child’s communication tool needs the same approach, only explained to parents in even plainer terms. This article covers how such data should be stored, what research shows about apps made for children, and the five questions worth asking any tool – not necessarily ours.
What data lives inside an AAC tool
An augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) tool is personal by nature. For it to work, very personal things end up inside it:
- photos – of the child’s room, toys, cup, mum, grandma;
- audio recordings – words spoken in a loved one’s voice;
- the child’s name, age and how their communication is going right now;
- usage history – which cards the child taps and when.
Taken together, this is probably the most sensitive data set a family can have: the child’s face, the home environment and their attempts to speak. So how a tool handles it is not a technical detail.
What research shows about apps for children
Researchers have been asking this question for years, and the answers call for attention. In 2018 a research group automatically analysed 5,855 popular free Android apps for children: most of them likely violated the US children’s privacy law (COPPA), usually not because of the developers themselves but because of third-party components built into the app that sent data to advertising and analytics networks (Reyes et al., 2018).
Closer still to preschoolers: in a 2020 study published in JAMA Pediatrics, researchers checked 451 apps actually played by 124 children aged three to five. Two thirds of the apps (67%) sent persistent device identifiers to third parties, and only 8% of the children had a set of apps that sent nothing at all (Zhao et al., 2020). In the Mozilla Foundation’s review of mental health apps – the category closest to AAC in terms of data sensitivity – 28 out of 32 received a warning label in 2022 (Mozilla, 2023).
Education tools are no exception. In 2022 Human Rights Watch analysed 163 remote-learning products recommended by the governments of 49 countries during the pandemic: 145 of them (89%) handled children’s data in ways that put their rights at risk, and the data travelled to 196 third-party companies, mostly in advertising technology (HRW, 2022).
A 2022 decision by the US Federal Trade Commission is a reminder that this is not theory: the maker of the game Fortnite paid a 275 million dollar fine for violations in handling children’s data – including voice chat switched on for children by default (FTC, 2022).
The good news is that all these cases share one cause and one solution. Data leaked where it travelled off the device in the first place. The safest data is data that never travels anywhere.
Two roads: the cloud or the device
An app can store a child’s data in one of two ways. In the cloud: photos and recordings travel to the developer’s servers. This is convenient – several devices can be kept in sync – but the data leaves the family’s hands. Its safety now depends on the developer, on their partners, and on what happens to the company five years from now.
On the device: everything stays on the tablet. Syncing is harder, but only the parents control the data. Kalbeja deliberately chose the second road, and that is an architectural decision, not a promise in a privacy policy. There is simply no code in the app that would send photos or recordings anywhere.
How this works in Kalbeja – specifically
Since I urge you to ask specific questions, I will answer specifically.
- Cards, photos, audio recordings, the child’s profile and statistics are stored only on the tablet, in an encrypted database (SQLCipher). The encryption key is kept in Android’s secure storage and cannot be reached from outside the app.
- Parent mode is protected by a PIN. What is stored is not the PIN itself but its hash, and the number of attempts is limited.
- The app contains no analytics or advertising components and no advertising identifier – exactly the kind of add-ons through which data leaked in the 5,855-app study mentioned above.
- The app works without the internet. It goes online in only two cases: to check a Kalbeja Pro licence and to download updates. What is sent then is the activation code, a random device identifier and the app version – not the child’s name, not photos, not recordings. The server runs in the European Union.
- Parents can export all data into a single file or delete it at any time. An honest warning: the export file is not encrypted, so it should be kept as carefully as a photo album.
One more thing, said openly. We want to understand which parts of the app are genuinely useful to families, so we are planning anonymous usage statistics: numbers only – how many cards were created, how often the board is used – and only with parents’ consent, with the option to withdraw at any time. Card names, photos, recordings and the child’s name do not go into those statistics, now or in the future. If this principle ever changed, we would announce it and ask for consent again.
What regulators already require
In the European Union, the GDPR gives children’s personal data special protection. In practice, expect three principles: minimisation (only what is necessary is collected), transparency (it is clear what is collected, by whom and why) and control (data can be accessed, moved and deleted).
In Lithuania, when a digital service is offered directly to a child, consent for a child under 14 is given by the parents or guardians (VDAI, 2019). In an AAC tool this means something simple: everything to do with the child’s data, from the first card to deletion, is managed by an adult, and the child sees only their board.
The UK’s data protection authority went further still: the Children’s Code, in force since 2021, sets out 15 standards for digital services used by children – the child’s interests before business, the highest privacy settings by default, no profiling and no geolocation tracking unless the service needs it (ICO, 2021). The code applies in the UK, but its questions are useful for assessing any educational app in any country.
For institutions – kindergartens, schools, education centres – there is one more aspect: when such a tool is used with children, the data controller is usually the institution itself. So children’s photos and recordings require parental consent, and a tool that keeps data only on the device makes this work considerably easier: there are no foreign servers and no data transfer agreements to assess.
Five questions for any app
Whichever tool you choose – Kalbeja or another – these questions will show within five minutes whether the developers thought about the child’s data.
- Do photos and recordings stay on the device, or do they travel to servers? If they travel – to which country?
- Is the data encrypted on the device? What happens if the tablet is lost?
- Does the app contain advertising or analytics components? The privacy policy should say so plainly.
- Can I export and delete everything myself at any time, without asking the developer?
- Does the app work without the internet? A tool that goes silent without a connection almost always keeps the data somewhere other than the device.
A good app answers all five clearly and briefly. If you have to hunt for the answer in a twenty-page document, that is an answer too.
Privacy is not a technical detail – it is respect for the child and the family. A good AAC tool helps a child say what they want and at the same time protects what the family holds most dear. There is no need to choose between the two. They go together, if the tool is designed that way from the start.